University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 44
Issue 1 Winter 2014

Article 2

2014

J.L.'s Time Bomb Still Ticking: How Navarette's
Narrow Holding Failed to Address Important
Issues Regarding Anonymous Tips
Andrew B. Kartchner

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Transportation Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kartchner, Andrew B. (2014) "J.L.'s Time Bomb Still Ticking: How Navarette's Narrow Holding Failed to Address Important Issues
Regarding Anonymous Tips," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 44: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol44/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

J.L. 'S TIME BOMB STILL TICKING: HOW NAVARETTE'S
NARROW HOLDING FAILED TO ADDRESS IMPORTANT
ISSUES REGARDING ANONYMOUS TIPS
Andrew B. Kartchner*
The conflict is clear and the stakes are high. The effect of
the rule below will be to grant drunk drivers one free
swerve before they can legally be pulled over by police. It
will be difficult for an officer to explain to the family of a
motorist killed by that swerve that the police had a tip that
the driver of the other car was drunk, but that they were
powerless to pull him over, even for a quick check. I

Five years ago, Chief Justice Roberts offered this emotionally
charged rhetoric in dissent from the Supreme Court's refusal to
review a Virginia case involving an anonymous tip of drunk: driving?
The relatively new Chief Justice took issue with the Virginia
Supreme Court's ruling that police must corroborate tips of drunk
driving before initiating traffic stopS. 3 Chief Justice Roberts, pointing
out that the Court has "repeatedly emphasized" the danger of drunk
driving, urged the Court to resolve this issue, which has "deeply
divided" the courtS.4 Although stopping short of implying how he
would decide the issue, the language in Chief Justice Roberts's
dissent left little doubt that he would favor a rule allowing police to
pull over motorists who had been reported to be driving drunk
without corroborating the tip. 5

*

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

J.D., magna cum laude, Regent University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, Portland
State University; Law Clerk to the Hon. James A. Teilborg, U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona. The views expressed in this article are the author's alone. The
author thanks his ever-supportive wife, Holly, for making his academic, intellectual,
and professional endeavors possible.
Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978, 981 (2009), denying cert. to 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va.
2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 979.
See id. at 981 ("[T]he police should have every legitimate tool at their disposal for
getting drunk drivers off the road.").
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The controversy is rooted in the Court's apprehensive view toward
anonymous tips as justification for investigatory stopS. 6 Police need
"reasonable suspicion" to make an investigative stop, often called a
"Terry stop,,,7 and questions arise when police base their suspicion on
tips from unidentified informants. 8
Identified informants'
trustworthiness and basis of knowledge can easily be evaluated based
on previous dealings with police, criminal records, or a number of
other "indicia of reliability,,,9 but this information is not available for
anonymous tipsters. \0 Additionally, anonymous tipsters, unlike
identified informants, are not subject to arrest if they make a false
complaint. I I Thus, the Court has historically required police to verify
the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of anonymous tips
before conducting an investigatory stop,12 typically by corroborating
information in the tip with first-hand police observations. 13
Requiring similar corroboration of tips reporting imminently
dangerous activity such as drunk-driving would force police to wait
until they observe dangerous behavior before they can do anything to
stop it, "by which time it may be too late.,,14
The Court put the issue into the limelight over a decade ago, when
Justice Ginsburg explained in dicta, in Florida v. JL., an anonymous
tips case involving a firearms violation:
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about
the circumstances under which the danger alleged in an
anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even
without a showing of reliability. We do not say, for
6.

7.

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

14.

See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,329 (1990) ("[A]n anonymous tip alone
seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity inasmuch as
ordinary citizens generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their
everyday observations and given that the veracity of persons supplying anonymous
tips is 'by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable.'" (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213,237 (1983))).
The Court has allowed investigatory stops based on "reasonable suspicion" since its
landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,30-31 (1968).
E.g., White, 496 U.S. at 329.
See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972).
See White, 496 U.S. at 329 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 237).
See Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47 (1972); see a/so Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 275
(2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Harris v. Virginia, 668 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 2008).
See J.L., 529 U.S. at 270; White, 496 U.S. at 328; Gates, 462 U.S. at 225, 246.
J.L., 529 U.S. at 270; see a/so White, 496 U.S. at 330-31 ("[W]hen the officers
stopped respondent, the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish
reasonable suspicion ...."); Gates, 462 U.S. at 268 ("[P]robab1e cause may yet be
established by independent police investigatory work that corroborates the tip .... ").
Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978,978 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), denying cert.
to 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need
bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a
person carrying a firearm before the police can
constitutionally conduct a frisk. 15
Since JL., courts have analogized drunk driving to Justice
Ginsburg's ticking time bomb hypothetical. I6
In April 2014, the Court resolved the question of corroboration in
Navarette v. California, a case out of California involving two
brothers l7 who were pulled over by police pursuant to an anonymous
tip.18 The information the tip reported was simple enough: five
minutes earlier, a silver Ford F150 truck with license plate number
8D94925 had run the tipster off the road at mile marker 88, heading
south on Highway 1.19 Using the information from the tip, the police
were quickly able to find the Navarettes driving a silver Ford F150
with a matching plate number on Highway 1, about twenty miles
from where the tipster had reported the reckless driving.20 But while
the identifying information in the tip pointed the police straight to the
Navarettes, the officers failed to observe any driving activity to

15.

16.
17.

18.

19.
20.

J.L., 529 U.S. at 273-74. J.L. involved an anonymous call to the Miami-Dade police

reporting "that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a
plaid shirt was carrying a gun." Id. at 268. With just that information, the police went
to the bus stop, saw a black teenager in a plaid shirt, and conducted a stop-and-frisk
which turned up a firearm. Id. It turned out the black teenager was "10 days shy of
his 16th birthday," so his possession of the firearm as a minor was illegal under
Florida law. Id. at 269.
Some courts have held firearm infractions to be "a qualitatively different [i.e., lower]
level of danger" than drunk driving. E.g., People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810,815 (Cal.
2006); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt. 2000).
E.g., Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867 ("Indeed, a drunk driver is not at all unlike a 'bomb,'
and a mobile one at that."); Wells, 136 P.3d at 815 (quoting Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867).
Mark Sherman, Court: Is Anonymous Tip Enough For Traffic Stop?, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Oct. 1, 2013, 12:54 PM), http://bigstory.ap.orglartic1e/court-anonymous-tipenough-traffic-stop.
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 n.l (2014). Aside from the sufficiency
of the anonymous tip to justify the stop, another issue in the case, which the Supreme
Court did not review, is whether the officer fabricated the tip itself. People v.
Navarette, No. A132353, 2012 WL 4842651, at *2-3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12,2012),
aff'd, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). The tip in question was made by a driver in Humboldt
County to that county's 911 call center. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686. The 911
dispatcher from Humboldt County, apparently realizing that the suspect was heading
to Mendocino County, then forwarded the tip to the Mendocino County 911 call
center, which then relayed the tip to the police officers that initiated the stop. Id.
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686-87.
Id. at 1687.
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corroborate the tip's assertion that the Navarettes were driving
recklessly.21
About a half hour after the tipster made the 911 call, the police had
caught up to the Navarette brothers, pulled them over, and requested
identification.22 During the conversation, the police officers smelled
marijuana and consequently searched the truck. 23 The search
uncovered four large bags of marijuana, fertilizer, hand clippers, and
oven bags, which apparently led an expert at the suppression hearing
to conclude that the Navarette brothers were looking to sell the
drugs. 24 Based on the evidence found in the search, the Navarettes
were charged with several drug crimes. 25
Pre-trial, the Navarettes moved to suppress the fruits of the search,
arguing that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to make the
traffic stop because the tip "did not provide enough information about
the alleged illegal driving to render the tip reliable without
corroboration of illegal activity by the officers.,,26 After the brothers'
motion to suppress the evidence was denied and all interlocutory
appeals failed, the brothers pled guilty to transportation of marijuana
and appealed the entire case until it reached the Supreme Court of the
United States. 27
The specific question before the Supreme Court in Navarette was:
"Does the Fourth Amendment require an officer who receives an
anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate
dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle?,,28 Justice Thomas
drafted a narrow opinion for the deeply divided COurt,29 avoiding
some of the more pressing sub-questions that will likely continue to
linger in the lower courtS.30 Justice Breyer joined the conservative

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.at1691.
Id. at 1686-87.
Id.
Navarette, 2012 WL 4842651, at *2.
Id. at * 1.
Id. at *7.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 5-6, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014)
(No. 12-9490),2013 WL 5476824.
Id. at *i; Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 50, No. 12-9490,2013 WL 5430499 (U.S.
Oct. 1,2013) (granting certiorari, limited to the first question in the request).
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686, 1692.
Most notably, Justice Thomas avoided the question posed by Justice Ginsburg in J.L.
concerning whether the same quantum of suspicion is necessary when imminently
dangerous activity is reported by an anonymous tipster. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,
273-74 (2000).

2014

J.L. 's Time Bomb Still Ticking

5

majority, trading places with Justice Scalia who wrote a
characteristically aggressive and somewhat snarky dissent. 3l
Although the Navarette majority resolved the issue of
corroboration, its narrowly crafted opinion left unanswered many
questions associated with anonymous tips of drunk driving.32 To give
lower courts the guidance they need, however, a more comprehensive
approach is necessary.
Some courts have understood the wider picture as they have
analyzed anonymous tips.33 Perhaps the most specific and useful
enunciation of a comprehensive approach to anonymous tips is found
in a Virginia appellate court decision written by Judge D. Arthur
Kelsey.34
In a 2003 opinion, Judge Kelsey identified three
"commonsense principles" by which courts should analyze
anonymous tips: "observational reliability," insider information, and
public danger. 35 This article uses Judge Kelsey's framework as a
suggestion for a more comprehensive approach to anonymous tips,
since the Court in Navarette only addressed one of these important
principles.
Part I of this Article explains what Judge Kelsey called
"observational reliability," which was recognized· in Navarette's
analogy to the Federal Rules of Evidence. A deeper look into the
history of hearsay law reveals that the common law has already
developed principles, now well established, that shed light on
whether certain statements are reliable. 36 These principles have been
codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence as the exceptions to the rule
against hearsay, which recognize that "under appropriate
circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness.'>37 It makes sense, then, to tum to
hearsay law for help in determining what kind of "circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" might be present in anonymous tips.
Specifically, this Article examines the history, scholarship, and
theory behind the Present Sense Impression exception to the rule

31.
32.
33.

34.

35.
36.
37.

Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686, 1692-97.
See id. at 1695-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Eighth Circuit, for example, elaborated on a range of factors that courts ought to
consider when weighing the reliability of an anonymous tip. United States v. Wheat,
278 F.3d 722, 731-37 (8th Cir. 2001).
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 576 S.E.2d 206, 210, 213-14 (Va. Ct. App.), aff'd on
reh 'g en bane, 583 S.E.2d 780 (Va. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 594 S.E.2d 595 (Va. 2004).
Id at 213-14.
FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note.
Id
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against hearsay and how that exception is useful in the anonymous
tips analysis.
Part II of this Article argues something that the Court in Navarette
completely overlooked: that corroboration is less useful when a tip
reports openly observable activity than when it reports concealed
crimes such as crimes of possession. When a tipster reports a crime
that is not readily observable by the public-as was the case in all the
anonymous tips cases the Supreme Court has decided-then
corroboration is necessary to prove the tipster's personal
knowledge. 38 When, however, a report of observable activity is
made, a tipster's personal knowledge is much less suspect. 39
Part III of this Article explores the most mystifying omission of the
Navarette decision: the balancing analysis most state courts have
conducted to weigh the imminent danger posed by drunk driving
against the intrusion of the Terry stop. In other words, many state
courts have held that the threat of imminent danger changes the
quantum of suspicion necessary to make a traffic stop "reasonable"
under the Fourth Amendment. 40 This is nothing new in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, for "exigent circumstances" have long
38.

39.

40.

See, e.g., Florida v. J.L. 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (holding that an anonymous tip that
only provided general information about J.L. lacked sufficient reliability and
corroboration by the police was insufficient because anyone in public could have
provided the information; accordingly, the court held that the anonymous tip must
provide predictive information about the alleged concealed criminal activity in order
to allow sufficient police corroboration); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990)
(holding that the police corroboration of the details provided by the anonymous tip
provided sufficient reliability to lawfully permit the officers investigatory stop of the
vehicle because the tip contained specific, predictive information about the
defendant's concealed criminal activity).
See State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 51 (Tenn. 2009) ("[A] report of readily
observable evidence of reckless driving carries a higher degree of inherent reliability
than does a report of a concealed weapon."); Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212,
1220 (Del. 2004) ("We agree that a tip about readily observable evidence of criminal
activity, such as erratic driving, is inherently more reliable than a tip about concealed
criminal activity. Because the basis of the tipster's knowledge is apparent where the
criminal activity is readily observable to other motorists or pedestrians, its reliability
is increased.") (footnote omitted).
See People v. Barbarich, 807 N.W.2d 56, 62 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) ("[T]he threat of
imminent danger [posed by concealed weapons or contraband] is not necessarily as
high as in the present case, in which an erratic driver threatened the lives of fellow
drivers."); Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d at 1221 ("[W]hen deciding whether an
anonymous tip of erratic driving provided reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle,
courts should balance the government's interest in responding immediately to reports
of unsafe driving against the comparatively modest intrusion on individual liberty that
a traffic stop entails. An erratic driver poses a potentially imminent threat of harm to
the public.") (footnote omitted).
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been held to justify even the most intrusive of searches,41 and the
Supreme Court has already relaxed Fourth Amendment principles
when drunk driving is involved. 42 Shockingly, the Court in Navarette
avoided this discussion altogether.
This Article concludes that by neglecting to address the issues
associated with insider information and the dangers of drunk driving,
the Court in Navarette missed an opportunity to effectively close the
book on anonymous tips, leaving many questions unresolved.
I. OBSERVATIONAL RELIABILITY

Judge Kelsey's framework first explains that certain reports should
be analyzed based on their content and the circumstances under
which the reports were made. 43 Judge Kelsey calls this an inquiry
into "observational reliability" because it gives weight to the details
of the report rather than the "personal reliability" of the tipster. 44
This commonsense principle flows from the obvious inability of
police to validate the personal trustworthiness of an anonymous
informant and a policy of encouraging "disinterested," "publicspirited" citizens to quickly report crimes and other dangerous
situations. 45 While a paid informer or one who seeks immunity for
his reports is inherently unreliable, and should be presumed as such,
ordinary tipsters have no such discrediting characteristics and should
not be treated with the same scrutiny merely because they decide to
not leave their name with the police. 46 Rather, an anonymous tip
made during or shortly after the commission of a crime witnessed by
41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

46.

See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) ("The Fourth Amendment does
not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would
gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others."); Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct.
1849, 1856 (2011) ("One well-recognized exception applies when 'the exigencies of
the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'" (quoting Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 576 S.E.2d 206, 213 (Va. Ct. App.), aff'd on reh'g en
bane, 583 S.E.2d 780 (Va. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 594 S.E.2d 595 (Va. 2004).
Id. at 213 (quoting State v. Wa1shire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Iowa 2001)).
Id.; Guzewicz v. Commonwealth, 187 S.E.2d 144, 148 (Va. 1972) ("Public-spirited
citizens should be encouraged to furnish to the police information of crimes.
Accordingly, we will not apply to citizen informers the same standard of reliability as
is applicable when police act on tips from professional informers or those who seek
immunity for themselves, whether such citizens are named or, as here, unnamed."
(citing People v. Glaubman, 485 P.2d 711 (Colo. 1971))).
Jackson, 576 S.E.2d at 213.
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the tipster ought to be evaluated primarily by analyzing the details of
the tip, not the personal characteristics of the tipster.
The Court in Navarette recognized this, noting that
contemporaneous eyewitness reports have "long been treated as
especially reliable.,,47 Indeed, this is a principle with deep roots in
the common law, and a number of other courts have relied on it to
justify Terry stops conducted pursuant to anonymous tips.48 Given
the Court's recent tendency to cite legal history in its constitutional
opinions,49 it is unsurprising that Justice Thomas would invoke this
deep history to support the holding that contemporaneous eyewitness
reports are inherently reliable. 50 Yet, given the brevity of the
majority's discussion and the vigor of the dissent in Navarette, it is
worthwhile to examine the roots of this concept.
1. The Common Law: Res Gestae

"[G]uarantees of trustworthiness. .. form the hallmark of all
exceptions to the hearsay rule."sl And if "circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness"s2 can save a hearsay statement from its "intrinsic
47.
48.

49.

50.
51.
52.

Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689 (2014).
United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722,734 (8th Cir. 2001) ("A careful reading of the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that this emphasis on the
predictive aspects of an anonymous tip may be less applicable to tips purporting to
describe contemporaneous, readily observable criminal actions, as in the case of
erratic driving witnessed by another motorist."); Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d
1212, 1220 (Del. 2004) ("Tips reporting erratic driving also may be more reliable
because they usually will be made close in time to when the tipster observes the
potential criminal activity.") (footnote omitted); People v. Barbarich, 807 N.W.2d 56,
62 (Mich. Ct. App. 20 II) ("[W]e must make clear that less information is required
from citizen informants reporting contemporaneous incidents .... "); State v. Sousa,
855 A.2d 1284, 1290 (N.H. 2004) (finding that a relevant factor in determining
"whether the tip is based upon contemporaneous eyewitness observations" is "whether
an anonymous tip gives rise to reasonable suspicion"); State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d
44, 51 (Tenn. 2009) ("[W]hen a tipster seeks to report the location of a reckless driver
at the time the reckless driving is observed or shortly thereafter, the tipster has a very
brief amount of time to contact the police, and the likelihood that the allegation is
fabricated is proportionately diminished.").
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592-95, 600-03, 606-11 (2008)
(describing the history of the right to bear arms); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,
739-43 (2008) (recounting the "history and origins of the writ [of habeas corpus]");
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-50 (2004) (discussing the history of the
Confrontation Clause); Hon. D. Arthur Kelsey, The Resurgent Role of Legal History
in Modern U.S. Supreme Court Cases, 37 VA. B. ASS'N. NEWS J. 10, 10-13 (2010).
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
United States v. Mitchell, 145 FJd 572, 576 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Miller v.
Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted».
FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note.
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weakness,,,53 then certainly some similar sets of circumstances can
show the reliability of a similar type of statement, an anonymous tip.
In other words, the rationale behind the hearsay exceptions sheds
some light on the type of circumstances that make a normally
unreliable statement sufficiently trustworthy. As Justice Thomas
noted in Navarette, the history and rationale of the present sense
impression exception is especially instructive when analyzing
anonymous tips.54
It is unclear when courts first began to recognize the present sense
impression exception, but at least one example predates the
Constitution by almost a century.55 In 1693, the English trial court in
Thompson and Wife v. Trevanion admitted into evidence a statement
made by an assaulted woman, reasoning that she made the statement
"immediate[ly] upon the hurt received, and before that she had time
to devise or contrive any thing [sic] for her own advantage. ,,56
Thompson seems to be the first court opinion to articulate the
rationale of the present-day present sense impression hearsay
exception: contemporaneous eyewitness observations are reliable
because they are made before the declarant has a chance to forget or
change his story.57
53.

Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 295-96 (1813) (Marshall, C.J.).

54.

Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.

55.
56.
57.

Thompson v. Trevanion, (1683) 90 Eng. Rep. 179 ~ 37 (K.B.).
Jd.
Id. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Thompson
court seemed to be more concerned with conscious misrepresentations made after an
event than inadvertent changes in memory. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory
committee's notes ("The underlying theory of [the present sense impression]
exception is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negat[e] the
likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.") (emphasis added). Courts
and scholars, however, have recognized that the contemporaneity requirement
negatives both deliberate and unconscious distortion of memory. Most notably, in
Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, what many call the "leading case" on present sense
impressions, GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 210
(1978); CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 298 n.69 (2d ed. E. Clearly 1972); Jon R. Waltz, The Present Sense Impression
Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REv. 869,
871 n.9 (1980) (citing RICHARD a .. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN ApPROACH
TO EVIDENCE 400 n.94 (1977», a Texas appellate court quoted from an evidence
treatise to explain the "safeguards" that spontaneous declarations have against
unreliability;
In the first place, the report at the moment of the thing then seen,
heard, etc., is safe from any error from defect of memory of the
declarant. Secondly, there is little or no time for calculated
misstatement, and thirdly, the statement will usually be made to
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English courts echoed the rule in Thompson for over a century, 58
and it even made its way into a United States Supreme Court ruling
almost two hundred years later. 59 But the present sense impression
concept-and the hearsay rule itself-remained "unsettled at the tum
of the eighteenth century.,,60 As the concept took shape, it eventually
acquired the name: res gestae or, in the singular, res gesta. 61
For some time in England, res gestae evaded concrete definition. 62
Literally translated "things done,,,63 res gestae was a term used to
describe all the central facts and circumstances surrounding the event
or transaction in a case. 64 Courts admitted the entire res gestae,
including hearsay statements, based on several rationales. 65 Some
statements were admitted because they were an integral part of the
event or transaction. 66 Today, such declarations are generally
considered statements of "legally operative fact" and outside the
hearsay rule entirely.67 Other statements were admitted because they
were "made at the same time with the thing which it imports" and

58.
59.
60.
61.

62.

63.

64.
65.
66.
67.

another (the witness who reports it) who would have equal
opportunities to observe and hence to check a misstatement.
Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 161 S.W.2d 474, 476-77 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942)
(quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK & ROY ROBERT RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 430 (1937)).
See, e.g., Aveson v. Kinnaird, (1805) 102 Eng. Rep. 1258 (K.B.) 1261; 6 East. 188,
193-94.
Travellers' Ins. Co. of Chi. v. Mosley, 75 U.S. 397,407 (1869).
Waltz, supra note 57, at 873.
Id. at 871. The difference between the singular and plural forms is not insignificant,
see id. at 873-74, but this Article, for simplicity's sake, will refer to it in its plural
form.
One scholar opined that the term "gained currency as much for its convenient
obscurity as for any better or more readily discernible reason." Id. at 873. Another
called it a "nebulous concept" until Edmond M. Morgan undertook to "make sense" of
it. Dennis D. Prater & Virginia M. Klemme, Res Gestae Raises Its Ugly Head, J.
KAN. B. ASS'N, Oct. 1996, at 24,25.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1310 (7th ed. 1999).
Id. (citing State v. Fouquette, 221 P.2d 404,417 (Nev. 1950)).
See Waltz, supra note 57, at 873-74.
Id. at 873-74.
See, e.g., United States v. Pang, 362 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004); State v. Beede,
931 A.2d 1258, 1262 (N.H. 2007). The historical understanding of this type of res
gestae comports with the modem understanding-legally operative words are not
hearsay. Waltz, supra note 57, at 873-74 ("[W]here the declarant's words are
themselves a part of the event or transaction in dispute, a part of the 'thing [singular]
done,' the hearsay rule has no application.") (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
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thus were part of the res gestae because of their evidentiary value. 68
This second type of res gestae laid the foundation for the present
sense impression hearsay exception. 69
Res gestae eventually made its way into American courts and "was
used here in an extraordinary variety of situations to allow the
admissibility of out-of-court statements and other evidence.,,7o After
years of inconsistent usage, renowned American evidence scholar
James Bradley Thayer undertook to clarify the meaning of res gestae
and its usefulness as a rule of evidence, with his work culminating in
a "brilliant,,71 three-part article on the topic.72 Thayer's research
sprang from the controversy sparked by an 1880 English homicide
case in which the judge excluded the statements of the victim, made
shortly after her throat was slit, because "it was not part of anything
done, or something said while something was being done, but
something said after something done. ,>7) This ruling spawned
controversy in the legal community and even prompted the trial judge
to compose and publish a defense of his ruling, which Thayer
addressed thoroughly. 74 Having given clarity to the nature of
contemporaneous eyewitness reports, Thayer's work has been
described as the "first careful definition of the [present sense
impression] exception by an American. ,,75
It was Thayer who first articulated the two types of res gestae used
by the COurtS. 76 According to Thayer, the principle behind the second
type of res gestae-the type that birthed the present sense impression
exception-"has always existed.'>77 The reasoning behind admitting
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

73.

74.

75.
76.
77.

James B. Thayer, Bedingfields's Case. -Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta. (pt.
3), 15 AM. L. REV. 71, 82 (\881) [hereinafter Thayer III].
Waltz, supra note 57, at 874.
Prater & Klemme, supra note 62, at 25.
Waltz, supra note 57, at 871.
James Bradley Thayer, Bedingfield's Case.-Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta.
(pt. I), 14 AM. L. REv. 817 (\880) [hereinafter Thayer I]; James Bradley Thayer,
Bedingfield's Case.-Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta. (pt. 2), 15 AM. L. REV.
I (1881) [hereinafter Thayer II]; Thayer III, supra note 68.
Waltz, supra note 57, at 871 (citing Thayer I, supra note 72, at 818). Apparently the
case was not officially reported. Id. at 871 n.17.
See, e.g., Thayer I, supra note 72, at 818-19 (discussing the facts and ruling of the
Bedingfield trial); Thayer II, supra note 72, at 4 (noting that neither Chief Justice
Cockburn or Mr. Tayler had discussed the historical origins of res gesta); Thayer III,
supra note 68, at 91 (discussing the use of Chief Justice Cockburn's
contemporaneousness requirement).
Waltz, supra note 57, at 871.
Id. at 876.
Thayer III, supra note 68, at 82.

12

UNIVERSITY OF BAL TIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 44

this type of res gestae is that it "takes notice of one of these strong
elements of authenticity, contemporaneousness.,,78
Thayer's work was followed-up by his student, Edmund Morgan,
who, over forty years later, "attempted, in a law review article which
matched his mentor's in perceptivity, to revive the Thayer
formulation of the present sense impression exception.,,79 When the
American legal profession was drafting the model rules of evidence
in the mid-1900s, Morgan became known as the "leading advocate of
the [present sense impression] exception. ,,80 When the Federal Rules
of Evidence were unveiled, Morgan was credited by the Advisory
Committee on the Rules for outlining the elements and "underlying
theory" of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1).81
2. Res Gestae in its Modern Form: FRE 803(1) - The Present Sense
Impression

After centuries of ,confusing and inconsistent precedent, the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence gleaned a
handful of important principles from the common law concept of res
gestae, many of which are contained in Rule 803, entitled
"Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay-Regardless of Whether
the Declarant is Available as a Witness.,,82 Section 803 is especially
helpful when considering the reliability of anonymous tips, as those
exceptions flow from the theory that "under appropriate
circumstances a ... statement may possess circumstantial guarantee~
of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the
declarant. ,,83
Of the 803 exceptions, the "present sense impression" exception in
Rule 803(1) is probably the most instructive-it being based largely
on the principle that contemporaneous observations are more reliable
78.
79.
80.
81.

82.

83,

Id. at 83,
Waltz, supra note 57, at 875 (citing Edward M. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of
Utterance Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE LJ. 229, 236-37 & n.l9 (1922)).
M,e. Slough, Spontaneous Statements and State of Mind, 46 IOWA L. REv, 224,249
(1961),
FED, R, EVID, 803 advisory committee's note ("The underlying theory of exception
[paragraph] (1) is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negat[e] the
likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation,") (citing EDMUND MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 340-41 (1962)).
FED. R. EVID. 803; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1423 (9th ed, 2009) ("In
evidence law, words and statements about the res gestae are [usually] admissible
under a hearsay exception (such as present sense impression or excited utterance),
Where the Federal Rules of Evidence or state rules fashioned after them are in effect,
the use of res gestae is now out of place."),
FED, R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note,
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than past observations. 84 Rule 803(1) was boiled down from over a
century of res gestae precedent to a few lines:
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay,
regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or
explaining ail event or condition, made while or
immediately after the declarant perceived it. 85
Thus, on its face, Rule 803(1) recognizes the value of statements
that describe events when those statements are made
contemporaneously with the event (or shortly thereafter) and with
personal knowledge of the event. 86
The Advisory Committee Notes on FRE 803(1) explain that "[t]he
underlying theory of [the present sense impression] exception is that
substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negative the
likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation. ,,87 This is so
because as time passes, the likelihood increases that a witness of an
event will fabricate a new story or the witness's memory will be
distorted. 88 Other commentary on the rule indicates that the elements
of the present sense impression exception are designed "[t]o assure
trustworthiness," and that the contemporaneity of the statement is
"perhaps [the] most significant[]" factor in determining whether a
statement is reliable. 89 As such, the present sense impression hearsay
exception is a great illustration of why contemporaneous reports are
presumptively reliable. 90
Of course, not all contemporaneous eyewitness reports are
sufficiently reliable. Notably, the Advisory Committee Notes on
FRE 803 express apprehension toward anonymous declarants: "when
[a] declarant is an unidentified bystander, the cases indicate hesitancy
84.

See id.

85.

FED. R. EVID. 803(1).

86.

See id.

87.
88.

Fed. R. Evid. 803 advisory committee's note.
2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.1 (4th ed. 1996)
("[T]he underlying rationale of the· present sense impression is that substantial
contemporaneity . . . minimizes unreliability due to [the declarant's] defective
recollection or conscious fabrication."); United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 840
(8th Cir. 2004); see also supra note 57.
John A. Bourdeau, When is Hearsay Statement "Present Sense Impression"
Admissible Under Rule 803(1) of Federal Rules of EVidence, 165 A.L.R. FED. 491,
504 (2000).
See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note.

89.

90.
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in upholding the statement alone as sufficient.,,91 It is important to
note, however, that this hesitancy does not arise from any inherent
unreliability of anonymous statements, but from the fact that
contemporaneity and personal knowledge are difficult to prove (or
disprove) when the declarant is not available for questioning. 92 Thus,
the Advisory Committee acknowledged that upholding anonymous
statements under rule 803 "would under appropriate circumstances be
consistent with the rule.,,93 While the Committee Notes do not
divulge what those circumstances might be, the cases indicate that
when the declarant is unidentified, contemporaneity and personal
knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence94 such as the
statement's language,95 timing,96 or consistency with other evidence
presented. 97
In sum, the present sense impression hearsay exception in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, born from centuries of development in the
91.

92.

93.
94.

95.

96.

97.

Id. (citing Garrett v. Howden, 387 P.2d 874, 877 (N.M. 1963); Beck v. Dye, 92 P.2d
1113, 1117 (Wash. 1939)).
Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507,510 (3d Cir. 1985) ("We do not conclude, however,
that statements by unidentified declarants are ipso facto inadmissible under
Fed.R.Evid. 803(2)."); Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 703, 706
(S.D. Ga. 1993) ("Because the declarant who made this call is unidentified and is
unavailable to testify, this issue presents a difficult matter to the Court."); Ramrattan
v. Burger King Corp., 656 F. Supp. 522, 528 (D. Md. 1987) ("Here, the bystanders are
unidentified, and their capacities to observe can neither be substantiated nor
attacked.").
FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note.
United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Because of the nature of
the call and conversation, we hold that the district court did not err in admitting the
tape-recording under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(1), present sense impression, and
803(2), excited utterance.").
Keating, 754 F.2d at 511 ("In some cases, however, the substance of the statement
itself does contain words revealing perception. A statement such as, 'I saw that blue
truck run down the lady on the comer,' might stand alone to show perception if the
trial judge finds, from the particular circumstances, that he is satisfied by a
preponderance that the declarant spoke from personal perception."); Crown
Amusements, Inc., 821 F. Supp. at 706 ("The caller specifically stated, '[W]e noticed
[the truck sideswipe a person],' thus indicating actual perception of the accident.")
(alteration in original).
Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F. Supp. at 706 ("[T]he timing of the declarant's call,
which was received approximately 2 minutes after the call placed by Carper, who was
at the scene of the accident, strongly suggests that the declarant observed the
accident.").
Compare Brown v. Keane, 355 F.3d 82, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that the
declarant had no personal knowledge of the event described because "no other
evidence in the case was compatible with the [declarant's] report"), with Ramrattan,
656 F. Supp. at 528 ("[T]his Court infers that if three [declarants] chose to tell
[someone] what had happened, then it is likely they saw the accident.").
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courts and followed by decades of meticulous scholarship, gives
courts a well-established framework by which to determine whether
an anonymous tip is reliable enough to constitute reasonable
suspicion. Despite considerable debate as to what constitutes the res
gestae of a case, one thing has been almost unanimously agreed upon
by all courts and scholars: contemporaneity of a statement with the
event described and personal knowledge of the event are significant
indications of the trustworthiness of the report. 98 Thus, despite
Justice Scalia's vigorous dissent,99 the majority in Navarette was
correct to rely on the rationale of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) to
show the reliability of an anonymous tip.
II. INSIDE INFORMATION
The second factor in Judge Kelsey's framework involves the
amount of inside information a tipster must demonstrate before police
may properly rely on the tip to justify a stop.lOO This, Judge Kelsey
explained, depends on whether the informant reported a "concealed

See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689 ("[W]e generally credit the
proposition that statements about an event and made soon after perceiving that event
are especially trustworthy .... "); id. at 1694 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The classic
'present sense impression' is the recounting of an event that is occurring before the
declarant's eyes, as the declarant is speaking .... It is the immediacy that gives the
statement some credibility; the declarant has not had time to dissemble or
embellish.").
99. Justice Scalia's criticism of the majority's reliance on the Federal Rules of Evidence
is a bit overblown. He claims that because the tipster was able to stop the car, record
the Navarettes' license plate number, and dial 911, the tip cannot be considered
contemporaneous. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1694 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But the
Advisory Committee notes make it clear that the present sense impression exception
"recognizes that in many, if not most, instances precise contemporaneity is not
possible, and hence a slight lapse is allowable." FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory
committee's notes. It seems odd that Justice Scalia would argue that the few seconds
it takes to stop a car (which had already been ran to the side of the road), observe a
license plate, and call 911 would constitute more than a "slight lapse."
Justice Scalia also argues that FRE 803(1) is not very helpful because, "cases
addressing an unidentified declarant's present sense impression 'indicate hesitancy in
upholding the statement alone as sufficient' proof of the reported event." Navarette,
134 S. Ct. at 1694 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This argument is also unpersuasive. The
question in hearsay objections is whether the statement is reliable enough to be
admitted into evidence, not whether the statement alone is sufficient to prove the fact
asserted. The former is a much lower standard, and therefore much more analogous to
the reasonable suspicion standard.
100. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 576 S.E.2d 206, 211-12 (Va. Ct. App.), aff'd on reh 'g en
bane, 583 S.E.2d 780 (Va. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 594 S.E.2d 595 (Va. 2004).

98.
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crime or an open and obvious crime.,,101 The idea is that one does not
usually know the details of a concealed crime, such as drug
trafficking, unless he has "inside information."lo2 Thus, reports of
concealed crimes, without indications that the tipster has inside
information, are less reliable than an eyewitness report of an open
crime. 103 Notably, the tips in Gates, White, and J.L. all reported
concealed crimes, putting the tipster's basis of knowledge in
question. 104
This distinction between concealed and open crimes has been lost
on many courts when ruling on anonymous tips, including the
Navarette COurt. I05 The Court went to great lengths to distinguish the
facts of Navarette from those in J.L., but neglected one important
detail: the tipster in J.L. reported a concealed crime (illegal
possession),106 while the tipster in Navarette reported an open crime
(reckless or impaired driving). 107 Another notable example is
provided by the Virginia Supreme Court in Jackson, which
overturned Judge Kelsey's instructive opinion with very little
attention to his analysis. 108 The Virginia Supreme Court insisted that
"[r]arely are the facts of two cases as congruent as the facts in J.L.
and this case,,,109 despite the fact that the tip in J.L. reported that the
defendant possessed a gun (a concealed crime)IIO while the tip in
Jackson reported that the defendant brandished a gun (an open
crime). III
The Court in Navarette missed an opportunity to highlight the
importance of the concealed-open crime distinction. Indeed, by
recognizing that anonymous tips reporting open crimes are less
suspect than tips reporting concealed crimes, the Court in Navarette
might not have concluded that it was a "close case.,,112
10 1.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

110.
111.
112.

Id. at 213.
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,332 (1990).
Jackson, 576 S.E.2d at 213.
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000); White, 496 U.S. at 327; Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 225 (1983).
See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683,1689 (2014).
J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 595, 601--{)3 (Va. 2004).
Id. at 601 (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 583 S.E.2d 780, 795 (Va. Ct. App.
2003) (Benton, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev'd, 594 S.E.2d
595 (Va. 2004)).
J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
Jackson, 594 S.E.2d at 597.
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2014) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496
U.S. 325, 332 (1990)).
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III. PUBLIC DANGER
Judge Kelsey's final factor to consider when analyzing anonymous
tips is the "seriousness of the danger posed by the alleged
illegality."ll3 When a tip reports activity that presents imminent
danger to the public, the amount of corroboration necessary 1,0
constitute reasonable suspicion ought to be diminished.
The
fundamental justification for this principle lies in the text of the
Constitution itself; the Fourth Amendment proscribes only
unreasonable searches and seizures. 114 Reasonableness is, of course,
a fluid concept, but it seems clear that searches and seizures are more
reasonable when conducted to prevent an imminent threat to the
public. liS Relatedly, searches and seizures are more reasonable when
they are limited in scope so as to minimize invasion of privacy. 116 In
short, to investigate imminently dangerous activity such as drunk
driving, police may act on less evidence, so long as the investigation
is limited in scope. 117
In fact, the Supreme Court has already applied this type of
balancing test in another case involving drunk driving, I 18 In
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme Court
upheld a sobriety checkpoint program because "the balance of the
State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this
system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree
of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped,
weighs in favor of the state program.,,1l9 Central to the Court's
holding was the "magnitude of the drunken driving problem" and the

113. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 576 S.E.2d 206, 214 (Va. Ct. App.), aff'd on reh'g en
bane, 583 S.E.2d 780 (Va. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 594 S.E.2d 595 (Va. 2004).
114. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Andrew B. Kartchner, Virginia in the Driver's Seat: How the
Supreme Court of Virginia Can Help the Supreme Court of the United States Finally
Establish the Drunk-Driving Exception to Anonymous Tips Law, 25 REGENT U. L.
REV. 185, 206 (2013) ("[T]he Founders intentionally infused a balancing test into the
Fourth Amendment by prohibiting only unreasonable searches and seizures.").
115. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) ("[An] emergency or dangerous
situation, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' . . . would justify a
warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search.").
116. State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862,868 (Vt. 2000).
117. People v. Barbarich, 807 N.W.2d 56, 62 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) ("As noted, such
investigative stops of automobiles have been deemed reasonable on the basis of less
information because the public's interest in safety of the roadways is high compared
to the minimally invasive nature of the investigation.").
118. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990).
119. Id.at455.
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"slight[ness]" of the inconvenience imposed by the checkpoints. l2O
Notably, ten years later the Court struck down checkpoints where
there was no imminent threat to the public, reasoning that without an
imminent danger the normal reasonable suspicion standards cannot
be altered. 121
Courts that have upheld stops of drunk drivers based on anonymous
tips have almost always included some sort of balancing test,
weighing the danger posed by drunk drivers against the intrusion of a
stop. 122 And courts that have struck down traffic stops based on tips
of drunk driving have largely ignored the impact that the threat of
imminent danger has on reasonable suspicion analysis,123 leading to
Chief Justice Roberts's grave concerns over the tenability of such an
approach. 124
Unfortunately, in an effort to avoid thorny issues in favor of a
narrow holding, the Court in Navarette ignored the question of
whether tips of drunk driving require a lesser quantum of suspicion to
justify a stop. Thus, the Navarette opinion will be of little help to the
lower courts that will undoubtedly continue to face arguments by
prosecutors that short traffic stops are justified by the serious threat
implicated by drunk driving.
CONCLUSION
Although Justice Scalia was unpersuaded by the Navarette
majority's recognition that contemporaneous eyewitness reports are
inherently reliable,125 this principle is time-tested and widely

120. Id. at 451.
121. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000) (striking down
checkpoints for drug trafficking).
122. E.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 737 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e think that
there is a substantial government interest in effecting a stop as quickly as possible.
That interest must be balanced against the individual's right to remain free from
unreasonable government intrusion.") (footnote omitted); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d
862, 868 (Vt. 2000) ("Balancing the public's interest in safety against the relatively
minimal intrusion posed by a brief investigative detention, the scale of justice in this
case must favor the stop; a reasonable officer could not have pursued any other
prudent course.") (citation omitted).
123. E.g., Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 150 n.3 (Va. 2008) (Kinser, l.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for ignoring the prosecution's argument "that
anonymous tips about incidents of drunk driving require less corroboration than tips
concerning matters presenting less imminent danger to the public"); McChesney v.
State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074-78 (Wyo. 1999).
124. Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978 (2009) (Roberts, C.l., dissenting).
125. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 -97 (2014) (Scalia, l., dissenting).
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accepted. l26 Still, in its attempt to craft a narrow opinion, the Court
missed an opportunity to give lower courts some much needed
guidance when it neglected to hold that (1) reports of openly
observable crimes are more reliable than tips of concealed crimes,
and (2) police need a lesser quantum of suspicion to justify stops
when acting pursuant to tips of dangerous activity such as drunk
driving.
The Court's failure to address the level of suspicion necessary to
stop reportedly drunk drivers is particularly strange because it leaves
"[whether]
the
unanswered JL. 's hypothetical question:
circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip
might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of
reliability."l27 Indeed, much of the scholarship and commentary has
centered on "whether anonymous tips about reckless or drunken
driving should be treated differentiy."l28 And courts that have
considered the issue have held that the level of danger implicated by
an anonymous tip should at least be a factor of the analysis. l29
Judging by the number of times he mentioned it at oral argument, it
seemed the Navarettes' appellate counsel was also convinced that this
important sub-issue would be decided by the Court.l30 But the Court
in Navarette ignored the issue completely.
Importantly, recognizing the factors mentioned by this Article
would not render all anonymous tips of drunk driving reliable, so the
potential for fraud by tipsters and police officers l3l under this
126. See id. at 1689 (majority opinion).
127. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,273 (2000).
128. E.g., Cas sandre Plantin, Navarette v. California: Corroborating Anonymous Tips in
Regards to Drunk Driving, CRIM. LAW PRACTITIONER (July 29, 2014),
http://wclcriminallawbrief.blogspot.coml20 14/07/supreme-court-watch-caseupdate.html ("[Navarette] turns on whether there should be a 'drunk or reckless driver
exception' to the corroboration requirement of anonymous tips."); Mark Sherman,
Supreme Court to Rule Whether an Anonymous Tip is Enough for a Traffic Stop,
HUFFINGTON POST (October I, 2013, 11 :23 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.coml
2013/1 % l/supreme-court-traffic-stop_ n_402345 8.html.
129. See cases cited supra note 122.
130. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683
(2014) (No. 12-9490),2014 WL 234212 at *20.
131. Justice Stevens expressed similar concerns in Alabama v. White:
Anybody with enough knowledge about a given person to make
her the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against her, will
certainly be able to formulate a tip about her like the one
predicting Vanessa White's excursion. In addition, under the
Court's holding, every citizen is subject to being seized and
questioned by any officer who is prepared to testify that the
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approach would be limited. For example, a tip from a motorist who
observes a reckless driver but does not notify police until he or she
returns home from a long drive would need more corroboration than
the tip in Navarette, since the report would not be contemporaneous
with the crime itself Similarly, a tip from a conscientious college
student who noticed that his drunken friend's car was no longer
outside the fraternity would not justify a stop of the car if found,
since the tipster would lack personal knowledge. In other words, a
comprehensive view of anonymous tips does not create an exception
to the notmal rules; it simply allows courts to recognize that
corroboration is not the only form of tip validation and to consider the
totality of the circumstances in determining whether an officer had
reasonable suspicion. 132
By recognizing that contemporaneous eyewitness reports are
reliable, the Court took one step toward closing the book on
anonymous tips jurisprudence.
But by neglecting other
considerations, such as the concealed-open crime distinction and the
dangerous nature of drunk driving, the Court has left many questions
unanswered. The time bomb mentioned in JL. is still ticking.

warrantless stop was based on an anonymous tip predicting
whatever conduct the officer just observed.
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 333 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. The biggest test of the value of this approach in balancing the need to safeguard the
public from danger against citizens' right to privacy would be a tip of a concealed,
dangerous crime not contemporaneously observed by the tipster. For example, a tip
reporting that someone is carrying a bomb in the trunk of a car would lack the
inherent. reliability of a contemporaneous eyewitness report and would require proof
of insider information because of the concealed nature of the activity. Such a tip
would force the Court to decide whether danger alone can overcome the requirement
that anonymous tips be verified.

